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Abstract 
 
Rationale, aims and objectives 
In 2008 the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) issued a Rapid 
Response Report (RRR) aimed at healthcare organisations providing inpatient 
care for mental health and learning disability patients, requiring organisations 
to make proper provision for life support and resuscitation for these patients. 
This paper examines whether effective implementation of the Rapid Response 
Report recommendations had occurred across health providers in England. 
 
Methods 
1) Questionnaires were distributed nationally to clinical staff and 
implementation leads.  
2) A national comparison of the number and severity of pre and post Rapid 
Response Report release related incidents involving 
choking/cardiac/respiratory arrest in Mental Health and Learning Disabilities 
settings was conducted.  
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3) Organisational compliance with the patient safety alert for all NHS 
Organisations in England was measured. 
 
Results 
There were five deaths post implementation of the Rapid Response 
Report that were considered to have serious enough error associated with the 
resuscitation. This was down from 18 pre the Rapid Response Report release.  
 
Conclusion 
Although our survey responses show a contradiction between 
organisational implementation and clinical staff awareness, our analysis 
suggests a reduction in moderate and severe harm cases and of deaths. There 
is evidence of a reduction in the worst types of error resulting in death, albeit 
with small numbers.  
  
Key words. Patient safety, resuscitation, cardiac arrest, mental health 
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Accessible summary 
 
 This paper reports on the issue of resuscitation in mental health 
inpatient environments. It reviews the literature on national standards 
and best practice when emergency situations arise in mental health 
settings. The discussion on the best practice literature takes place 
alongside the reporting of a national evaluation of how National Patient 
Safety Agency improvement guidelines for the provision for life 
support and resuscitation for mental health service users was effectively 
implemented across health care providers in England. 
 
 Methods used to establish the effective use of the guidelines include 
feedback from clinical staff and staff responsible for the implementation 
of the new national standards for resuscitation. Serious incident data 
was also compared prior to the release of the national guidelines and 
after the guideline release dates.  This included looking at events around 
choking and cardiac/respiratory arrest in inpatient areas.  
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 There were five deaths post implementation of the guidelines that were 
considered to have serious enough error associated with the 
resuscitation process.  This was down from 18 prior to the release of the 
guidelines. However our survey showed that despite organisations 
reporting 100% compliance with the implementation of the guidelines, 
around half of frontline clinical staff were not aware of them. 
 
 Although our survey responses show a contradiction between 
organisational and clinical staff awareness, our analysis suggests a 
reduction in moderate and severe harm cases and of deaths. There is 
evidence of a reduction in the worst types of error resulting in death, 
albeit with small numbers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
Introduction - background to study and overview of harm from the 
literature 
 
This study looks at evaluating national guidance developed to reduce 
the incidence of death and harm associated with mismanaged resuscitation in 
mental health settings. This harm is evidenced in the patient safety literature 
and in the national data sets reported as patient safety incidents and collated at 
a national level.  
 
Patients in mental health and learning disabilities settings can be 
vulnerable to cardiac or respiratory arrest through coexisting physical illness, 
self-harm, and the effects of medication, including rapid tranquilisation. They 
are also vulnerable to choking from a variety of causes such as dysphagia 
associated with illnesses like dementia, behaviour such as food bolting, pica 
(attempting to eat non-food items) or intentional self-harm. (National Patient 
Safety Agency, 2008 Rapid Response Report and Supporting Information). 
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The association of higher rates of physical disease and increased rates 
of morbidity and mortality for people with mental health problems has been 
widely reported for decades. (Harris and Barraclough, 1998).  They are at an 
increased risk of a whole range of physical conditions including coronary 
heart disease, diabetes, and respiratory diseases. Antipsychotic medications 
have also been implicated in sudden cardiac deaths. (Mehtonen et al 2002  and 
Aziz et al 1999).  People with learning disabilities are at a higher risk of 
additional health problems than the general population including increased 
respiratory difficulties, poor nutrition and hydration, and choking. (Aziz et al, 
1999). No other published international work exploring the impact of policy 
changes on safer resuscitation practice in mental health could be found by the 
authors of this paper. This maybe because clinical research into acute trauma 
resuscitation is not well documented generally (Champion et al, 2007).  
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National Patient Safety information and subsequent alert and 
intervention 
 
The National Reporting and Learning Service manages a national safety 
reporting system that receives confidential reports of patient safety incidents 
from healthcare staff across England and Wales. Clinical safety experts then 
analyse this data to identify common risks, trends and numbers of events to 
help inform policy and improve patient safety. Where necessary alerts are 
distributed throughout the NHS on the basis of this information received to 
highlight where services need to immediately address practice concerns or 
specific risks. An analysis of National Reporting and Learning Service data 
prior to 2008 had revealed 599 reports of at least moderate harm related to 
choking or cardiac or respiratory arrest in Mental Health and Learning 
Disabilities settings. (National Patient Safety Agency 2008).  
 
The National Reporting and Learning Service data received in relation to 
resuscitation in mental health demonstrated wide variations in standards of 
resuscitation. Of these incidents, 26 described significant lack of staff 
knowledge, skills, or equipment. Three patient deaths occurred after choking 
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on food. Another 22 reports were of moderate or severe harm following 
choking. In November 2008 therefore, the National Patient Safety Agency 
issued a Rapid Response Report (2008) aimed at healthcare organisations 
providing inpatient care for mental health and learning disability patients. It 
required organisations to make proper provision for life support and 
resuscitation for these patients. Evidence from the reports had indicated a wide 
variation in standards of resuscitation, as well as failure to act on deterioration 
of patients and missed physical symptoms. The National Patient Safety 
Agency (2007) highlighted these concerns and reinforced actions, (based on 
NICE guidance and Resuscitation Council UK standards), by issuing a Rapid 
Response Report to all NHS organisations with actions to improve the rate of 
successful resuscitation in mental health and learning disability settings. The 
deadline to complete these actions was 20 May 2009. The Rapid Response 
Report provided the following recommendations; 
 
   1. Basic life support (BLS) training is based on Resuscitation Council (UK) 
standards, including the management of choking. 
   2. Patient areas have immediate access to BLS equipment, and automated 
external defibrillators where appropriate. 
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3. All patient areas where a cardiac arrest might be expected at least once 
every five years should have access to Automated External Defibrillators 
(AEDs) within three minutes. 
   4. Units where rapid tranquilisation, physical intervention, or seclusion may 
be used have access to staff trained in immediate life support and equipment. 
   5. Training includes regular practices where feasible. 
   6.  Healthcare organisations identify a leadership role for resuscitation 
issues. They should also audit and report on life-support training attendance, 
and act on any lapses. 
 
To determine whether the implementation of the Rapid Response 
Report recommendations had occurred, an evaluation was undertaken which 
are described in the next section.  
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Evaluation methods 
 
A questionnaire was distributed nationally through patient safety action 
leads in each of the nine Strategic Health Authorities to all their mental health 
clinical staff to assess whether the Rapid Response Report actions had been 
acted upon. The survey began by reminding staff that in November 2008 the 
National Patient Safety Agency had issued a Rapid Response Report - 
NPSA/2008/RRR010: Resuscitation in mental health and learning disability 
settings. It was explained that the evaluation was seeking to establish 
awareness of the alert amongst staff and evidence of successful 
implementation of the actions of the Rapid Response Report. These leads were 
asked whether their organisations were compliant with guidelines that 
promoted a rolling programme of basic life support training for all staff (based 
on Resuscitation Council UK standards that include the management of 
choking).  Staff were asked what resuscitation training programmes had been 
completed (or refreshed) in the last year. All surveys were electronic based 
and included free text boxes at the end of the surveys to allow staff to share 
other views on the Rapid Response Report system and the information 
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provided by the National Patient Safety Agency. This gave completers of the 
survey the opportunity to give feedback on issues important to them whilst 
providing some potentially valuable additional qualitative data.  
 
Secondly a comparison of the number and severity of pre Rapid 
Response Report release and post Rapid Response Report release related 
incidents involving choking or cardiac or respiratory arrest in Mental Health 
and Learning Disabilities settings, (using data reported via the National 
Reporting and Learning System), was conducted.  This was intended to 
establish if reported levels of harm with relation to adverse events around 
resuscitation and in mental health and learning disability settings had altered. 
This involved using expert clinical reviewers pre and post the Rapid Response 
Report implementation to assess whether problems identified in resuscitation 
events reported to the Reporting and Learning Service, were preventable and 
avoidable.  
 
Lastly the Central Alert System was reviewed up until April 2010 one 
year after the original implementation date. The Central Alert System is a 
web-based system for issuing patient safety alerts and other safety guidance to 
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the NHS and is used as a mechanism for checking organisational compliance 
with patient safety alerts for all NHS Organisations in England. Organisations 
are required to ‘sign off’ via the Central Alert System when they have 
assessed that they have implemented the guidelines recommended in the 
Rapid Response Report. Although organisational (self) reporting is a limited 
proxy measure for establishing whether implementation has occurred, it was 
considered to be a potentially useful measure alongside the measurement of 
staff views and incident reporting. 
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Findings 
 
Staff responses came from 19 organisations out of a total of 58 mental 
health providers, (number of mental health trusts in UK 2011), with some 
Trusts having a number of responses. A variety of staff responded. Table 1 
show that on average 50% of the respondents were not aware of the Rapid 
Response Report, with community staff being the least aware with less than a 
quarter of community staff being aware of the Rapid Response Report (21%). 
Awareness of Rapid Response Report was greatest amongst senior staff 
(50%), followed by front line staff (36%).  However 51% of frontline staff and 
50% of the total respondents had no awareness of the Rapid Response Report. 
Front line staff consisted of any ward based clinical staff such as doctors, 
nurses and nursing assistants but not consultant grade medical staff (as will be 
seen later this group was included in a more senior category). Community 
staff included clinical nurses, community psychiatric nurses and liaison staff. 
Senior/managerial staff consisted of consultant psychiatrist, modern matrons, 
nurse managers, risk managers and other senior managers.  
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Most staff had at least basic life support training or more including 
immediate and advanced life support. Table 2 shows that of the community 
staff 61% had some form of life support training. For frontline staff this figure 
was 82% and for senior staff and managers this figure was 83%. The figures 
returned in our survey suggest a low level of advanced life support training 
across all the three staff groups; community (2%), frontline staff (6%) and 
senior clinical or managerial posts (10%). Resuscitation experience (Table 3) 
was equivalent for community and frontline staff (26% and 27%) and higher 
for more experienced staff. (48%). 
 
In terms of feedback from implementation leads, 27 organisations out of 
a possible 56 mental health providers reported compliance with the Rapid 
Response Report actions (identified earlier in the paper). These ranged from 
41% for action 5, 67% for actions four and six and 78% for actions one, two 
and three. We also asked implementation leads whether risk assessments had 
been carried out on whether Automated External Defibrillators were required 
and 56% said they had.  
17 
 
 
Qualitative feedback from the clinicians provided by them at the time of 
completing the surveys.  
 
A number of respondents took the opportunity to comment more 
generally when responding to the survey at the end of the survey in free text 
boxes provided. For example some frontline staff found the training to be 
interesting, but that there was not enough training given around emergency 
drug administration, or for skills and knowledge around working with elderly 
people. One community staff member commented that they had received 
additional advanced training for anaphalaxis since the swine flu vaccinations 
as well as for the administration of intra-muscular adrenaline. Another 
commented that whilst working in the community setting, the recent stance 
had been that community psychiatric nurses/social workers did not require 
basic life saving skills updates. 
 
One senior manager expressed a view that there was a ‘mess in 
Learning Disability services, under local authority management.’ Furthermore 
that the role of clinicians was unclear and caused a lot of confusion as to what 
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was required regarding NHS requirements. Not all feedback was 
complimentary. Another senior manager expressed a view that in ‘my 25 years 
on inpatient units I have never really had to use Basic Life Support and I 
wonder if the time spent in training and policy making is disproportionate.’  
 
Qualitative feedback from the implementation leads 
 
Similarly the implementation leads were also given the opportunity to 
comment more generally in open text boxes within the electronic surveys at 
the end of the questionnaire. A few themes emerged from the free text 
responses including seeing the implementation of the national guidance as a 
‘useful’ process for organisations, finding the supporting information on the 
clinical issue useful in itself, identifying that the implementation of the 
national guidelines could be impeded by organisational barriers and that the 
process had an effect of promoting best practice. Some examples of the 
implementation leads qualitative responses are shared here. 
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The usefulness of the implementation process 
 
Implementation leads commented that their Trusts had a greater 
understanding of response times to medical emergencies as a result of the 
Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation drills undertaken in clinical areas. Two leads 
commented on how their managers had become more aware of the need for 
regular training in skills that are rarely used whilst simultaneously staff had 
become much more aware of their roles and responsibilities in particular 
around the importance of the Resuscitation Officer. Two Trusts commented 
on how the implementation process had led them to a review of the equipment 
and to realise that some of their equipment was out of date or in the wrong 
location. The clear advice and guidance, that had the effect of increasing 
awareness and clarity was appreciated with one lead giving the example of 
how standardisation (promoted within the guidelines) would help emergency 
teams respond in unfamiliar areas, such as out-patients, with deteriorating 
patients using oxygen, and ‘increased awareness of how to use the defib 
equipment.’ Others commented that the Rapid Response Report had proved to 
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be a positive tool in reinforcing the importance of the availability of 
resuscitation equipment and standards required in life support training.  
 
The supporting information was considered useful  
  
The critical incident examples provided were reported by several 
implementation leads to be interesting and useful; they provided helpful 
contextual information; gave senior clinical staff a framework for reviewing 
practice and support decision making. Previously the Resuscitation Council 
literature had been very acute care focused and therefore specific risks for 
mental health had not been included commented one implementation lead. 
 
Barriers to implementation 
 
As far as barriers to implementation were concerned 19% of organisations 
reported a lack of resources, time and staff, whilst 15% reported difficulties 
around standardisation and maintaining training programmes as specific 
difficulties around the implementation of the national guidelines. 
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Table 1.  Here 
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Table 2. Here 
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Table 3. Here 
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Comparison of the number and severity of pre Rapid Response Report 
release and post Rapid Response Report release related incidents 
involving choking or cardiac or respiratory arrest in Mental Health and 
Learning Disabilities settings 
 
Tables 4 report the Reporting and Learning System data used at the 
National Patient Safety Agency to determine if levels of harm and death in 
relation to adverse events around resuscitation and in mental health and 
learning disability settings had altered.  Table 4 shows a pre Rapid Response 
Report total number of 8 combined severe and moderate harm to patients with 
18 deaths totalling 26 cases. The table shows a post Rapid Response Report 
total number of 8 combined severe and moderate harm to patients with 5 
deaths, totalling 13 cases. Table 5 shows a Chi Squared analysis of the 
proportion of harm and death to numbers of reported harms for pre Rapid 
Response Report (26/599) compared to post Rapid Response Report (13/567). 
This result was at a borderline level of significance of just over 0.05. However 
a further comparative analysis shown in table 6, of just the proportion of 
deaths for pre Rapid Response Report (18/599) and post Rapid Response 
Report (5/567) was highly significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Finally the Central Alert System returns reported that all mental health 
providers had implemented the guidelines recommended in the Rapid 
Response Report. 
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Table 4 Here 
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Table 5 Here 
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Table 6 here 
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Discussion 
 
The following discussion outlines the change in numbers of resuscitation 
errors pre and post the Rapid Response Report. It also examines organisational 
compliance with the Rapid Response Report, as well as resuscitation 
awareness amongst staff and knowledge. Additionally it explores staff views 
on the usefulness of information issued as part of the alert from the National 
Patient Safety Agency.  
 
There were five deaths post implementation of the Rapid Response 
Report considered to have serious enough error associated with the 
resuscitation, such that they were reported to the National Reporting and 
Learning Service. This was down from 18 such cases prior to the release of 
the Rapid Response Report. The details of these 5 incidents included; on one 
occasion a defibrillator machine being in situ but failing to work when used; 
an emergency situation whereby a call had to be made to the ambulance 
service three times in order to get an ambulance to attend; a collapsed patient 
after a hanging attempt, with a manager attempting four times to call 
emergency services but could not get through (older adults); a deteriorating 
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patient complaining of chest and arm pain resulting in the duty doctor being 
called but then not responding until an hour later. After 20 minutes of waiting 
emergency services were called.  
 
Our survey showed a 100% compliance reporting from organisations 
with the Rapid Response Report. However around half of frontline staff were 
not aware of the Rapid Response Report. Under a quarter of community staff 
were aware of the Rapid Response Report. Lower rates of awareness amongst 
community staff may reflect a perception that resuscitation and medical 
emergencies are less of an issue in the community setting. Being away from 
the hospital environment may lead to a view that medical emergencies are not 
the role of community based psychiatric professionals perhaps partly being 
reflected in some of the textual responses from staff. If this is the case, then 
this is far from ideal as the original scoping exercise performed by the 
National Patient Safety Agency identified concerns about staff not having 
sufficent skills or being able to intervene before the paramedics arrived when 
medical emergencies did occur. 
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The difference in results between organisations and clinical staff could 
be explained by staff not being aware of the Rapid Response Report, yet being 
aware of the information, issues and necessary actions around resuscitation. In 
other words the Rapid Response Report may well have been implemented at 
the organisational level such that it had its intended ‘effect’ on training 
implementation, though staff were not aware of its existence as a national 
policy. The National Patient Safety Agency acknowledged that this was an 
unusual alert in that all the important aspects could be potentially 
implemented successfully without necessarily involving front line staff. 
Furthermore ‘managers’ are often clinically senior people themselves and 
therefore the cascading of training through professional leads such as 
emergency team leaders, may have reflected a higher awareness at a more 
senior level. 
 
If however our results reflect a genuine lack of knowledge around 
resuscitation, then this is of concern. The difference in expressed awareness of 
the Rapid Response Report between organisations and clinical staff could 
raise questions as to how organisations successfully disseminate best practice 
guidelines. This is also a challenge given the numerous competing training 
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demands placed on staff and that managers have to ensure staff attend and 
complete.   
 
However although our survey responses show a contradiction between 
organisational and clinical staff awareness, our statistical analysis of incidents 
does suggest a reduction in moderate and severe harm cases and of deaths. 
 
 
Additional qualitative data provided as feedback from the implementation 
leads as part of their survey returns may not be as robust as the 
aforementioned data. It may even be susceptible to bias due to the small 
number of responses. However the implementation leads are senior 
experienced clinical staff who represent large organisations whose views of 
implementation process are worth reflecting on. For example the 
implementation leads had commented on how the issuing of a national Rapid 
Response Report with clear advice and guidance, had increased awareness and 
clarity. Favourable comments were also fed back via the electronic survey 
around the supporting information (National Patient Safety Agency, 2008 
supporting information) which included defined rationales for training 
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requirements, as well as clear statistical evidence and guidance on the 
implementation. Specifically the supporting information on choking related 
incidents was commented upon as being helpful as this was specific to mental 
health. A theme of the implementation having helped to promote best practice 
emerged with some implementation leads expressing that the Rapid Response 
Report addressed risks and concerns which frontline practitioners may have 
long been aware of but not fully appreciated.
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Life support. National standards and best practice 
 
The Resuscitation Council UK (2010) requires all healthcare staff to 
have on-going training in basic life support, and additionally suggests that 
Automated External Defibrillator should be provided in any healthcare setting 
that might reasonably expect to use them at least once every five years. 
 
Staff ought to be trained in immediate life support standards and have 
access to appropriate equipment for ILS (including Automated External 
Defibrillators), in situations where rapid tranquilisation is required. In any 
mental health or learning disabilities setting where rapid tranquilisation, 
physical intervention, or seclusion is never used (and cardiac arrest even once 
every five years is unlikely), it is important that staff still have the skills to 
provide basic life support. Furthermore the equipment they need to do this 
without risk to themselves (e.g. self-inflating bag-mask devices, bag valve 
masks, or mouth-to-mask devices) should also be available.  
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In the United Kingdom standards for clinical practice and training in 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation are set by the Resuscitation Council in 
collaboration with the Royal College of Anaesthetists, The Royal College of 
Physicians, and the Intensive Care Society, and based on expert review of the 
evidence base. Whilst the highest levels of resuscitation are only practical in 
acute general hospital settings, Resuscitation Council (UK) standards contain 
principles that can be adapted to the particular risks and challenges of all 
health care settings. These guidelines for basic life support also include an 
element on the management of choking.  
 
Final thoughts, limitations and future work. 
 
Resuscitation events are rare and preventable deaths associated with 
error in the resuscitation procedure are rarer still. The small numbers 
associated with these types of events does mean some caution is required in 
looking at the reductions in incidents around death and harm.   
 
This evaluation of the implemetation of national guidelines for 
resuscitation raises a number of questions for debate and possible further 
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research. Firstly the low level of immediate life support in the community 
(only 2% compared to 25% for frontline and 31% for senior clinical and 
managerial staff) probably reflects the genuine challenge of providing trained 
personnel and access in the community to equipment such as Automated 
External Defibrillators, bag valve mask, oxygen, cannulas, fluids, suction and 
first-line medications.  To an extent this low level of training for immediate 
support and for advanced life support for the same reasons would be expected, 
compensated for in the main by higher levels of basic life support. However of 
concern are the levels overall of no training at any level, basic or otherwise in 
the community, especially if considered alongside the non-responders which 
may also have a proportion of non-training within their numbers. Arguably, 
basic life support training is also a mechanism for appreciating the 
deteriorating patient as well and without training there is a risk of deteriorating 
patients being missed.  It can also be questioned as to whether the low level of 
Automated External Defibrillator training in the community is a justified 
approach. Automated External Defibrillators are now available in many public 
spaces in the UK as the result of a successful government policy to promote 
and introduce public access defibrillation. (Davies et al, 2002). The question 
therefore arises that if the public can have access to Automated External 
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Defibrillators with no prior training in an emergency should community staff 
not be expected to have at least some means of readily accessing Automated 
External Defibrillators, such as within their vehicles and at Community 
Mental Health facilities or equivalent.  
 
Future work should involve site visits to examine the physical standards 
and conditions of resuscitation equipment and the extent of knowledge and 
practice amongst inpatient and community staff. An audit tool is available 
from the authors for organisations to check the rational for the National 
Patient Safety Agency recommended actions as well as the compliance with 
the standards identified in the original Rapid Response Report in the 
supporting information in appendices 1 and 2. (National Patient Safety 
Agency, 2008). 
 
The authors have found no evidence in the literature, or from their 
communications with external agencies, that systematic checking of cardiac 
arrest equipment and trolleys occurs as part of any external official visit or 
quality and safety checks. In future there needs to be a clear means identified 
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to ensure that monitoring resuscitation standards in mental health and learning 
disabilities continues.  
 
As with all studies there are limits set regarding the time afforded to the study 
and what is being investigated. On this occasion the data explored used 
reasonable periods of time for pre and post comparison. However future 
research may explore using a longer period of trend data on death or severe 
harm associated with error in resuscitation in mental health settings to 
establish more certainty on sustained change in practice and safety.  
 
In conclusion we can say that the initial data analysed by the National Patient 
Safety Agency leading up to the Rapid Response Report identified a problem 
in Mental Health Services. Since the release of the Rapid Response Report 
there have been national attempts to improve services, with some evidence of 
a reduction in the worst types of error resulting in death, albeit with small 
numbers. However this evaluation cannot provide conclusive evidence overall 
at this stage, for significant knowledge and practice changes around the 
management of physical health emergencies but it does show some 
encourages signs of safer services emerging.  
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Table 1.  Responses for awareness of RRR from community, frontline and 
senior /managerial staff 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Count of Aware of RRR group    
Aware of RRR community   frontline   senior/managerial   
Grand 
Total 
  
No Answer Entered 21% 13 13% 36 13% 7 14% 56 
No 57% 35 51% 143 37% 19 50% 197 
Yes 21% 13 36% 101 50% 26 36% 140 
Grand Total 100% 61 100% 280 100% 52 100% 393 
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Table 2. Types of staff and training that they described as having 
undertaken 
 
 
Count of resus training  group               
resus training community frontline senior/managerial Grand Total 
[No Answer Entered] 21% 13 13% 36 13% 7 47% 56 
Advanced life support 2% 1 6% 17 10% 5 18% 23 
Basic life support 57% 35 48% 135 
42% 22 
147
% 192 
First Response 0%   2% 5 0%  2% 5 
Immediate life support 2% 1 25% 69 31% 16 58% 86 
None 18% 11 5% 14 4% 2 27% 27 
Other 0%   1% 4 0%  1% 4 
Grand Total 100% 61 100% 280 100% 52 
300
% 393 
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Table 3. Resuscitation experience amongst community, frontline and 
senior /managerial staff 
 
Count of Resus 
experience group 
Resus experience Community frontline senior/managerial Grand Total 
[No Answer Entered] 21% 13 13% 36 13% 7 14% 56 
No 52% 32 60% 168 38% 20 56% 220 
Yes 26% 16 27% 76 48% 25 30% 117 
Grand Total 100% 61 
100
% 280 
100% 52 
100% 
393 
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Table 4. Types of error associated with resuscitation procedure with recorded number of harm (severe 
and moderate) and death pre and post RRR 
Outcome pre* Outcome post **
Theme of resuscitation problem Patient death severe mod Total Patient death severe mod Total
Lack of staff knowledge or skills 6 2 8 0 1
Availability /use of resuscitation equipment 5 2 7 1 0
Unnecessary transfer 4 2 6 1 4
Other reasons 3 2 5 3 3
Total 18 8 26 5 8 13
 
 
*January 2006 - March 2008 
**Combined 1st November 2008- 30th April 2009 (implementation period) and 1st May 2009 - 30th 
April 2010 (post rrr) 
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Table 5. All harm associated with error and preventable harm in 
resuscitation procedure. Preventable harm is determined using expert clinical review as described in the original 
NPSA Supporting Information National Patient Safety Agency (2008) Rapid Response Report NPSA/2008/RRR010: Resuscitation in 
mental health and learning disability settings.  
 
harmed unharmed
alert
Frequency
Percent 1.11 47.51 48.63
Row Pct 2.29 97.71
Col Pct 33.33 49.16
Frequency 26 573 599
Percent 2.23 49.14 51.37
Row Pct 4.34 95.66
Col Pct 66.67 50.84
Frequency
Percent 3.34 96.66 100
Statistic DF Value Prob
Chi-Square 1 3.7783 0.0519
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square 1 3.8594 0.0495
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square 1 3.1714 0.0749
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square 1 3.775 0.052
Phi Coefficient -0.0569
Contingency Coefficient 0.0568
Cramer's V -0.0569
Cell (1,1) Frequency (F) 13
Left-sided Pr <= F 0.0366
Right-sided Pr >= F 0.9833
Table Probability (P) 0.0199
Two-sided Pr <= P 0.0718
Table of alert by harm
harm
Total
13 554 567
post rrr
Fisher's Exact Test
Sample Size = 1166
pre rrr
39 1127 1166
Total
Statistics for Table of alert by harm
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Table 6. Deaths associated with error in resuscitation procedure 
death
other 
harm
alert
Frequency
Percent 0.43 48.2 48.63
Row Pct 0.88 99.12
Col Pct 21.74 49.17
Frequency 18 581 599
Percent 1.54 49.83 51.37
Row Pct 3.01 96.99
Col Pct 78.26 50.83
Frequency
Percent 1.97 98.03 100
Statistic DF Value Prob
Chi-Square 1 6.7906 0.0092
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square 1 7.2373 0.0071
Continuity Adj. Chi-Square 1 5.7369 0.0166
Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square 1 6.7847 0.0092
Phi Coefficient -0.0763
Contingency Coefficient 0.0761
Cramer's V -0.0763
Cell (1,1) Frequency (F) 5
Left-sided Pr <= F 0.0072
Right-sided Pr >= F 0.9982
Table Probability (P) 0.0054
Two-sided Pr <= P 0.0105
Table of alert by harm
harm
Total
5 562 567
post rrr
Fisher's Exact Test
pre rrr
23 1143 1166
Total
